I’m not sure what it all means, if anything, but plugging Neuroscience into Google’s newest toy, Google Trends, reveals a downward trend of Neuroscience related searches in recent years, an upward trend in Neuroscience news items, and Korea to be the top nation in the world when it comes to searching for Neuroscience. Within the US, Washington suburb Bethesda leads the field, searching about four times as much as runner-up Baltimore. What does it all mean? Here’s the answer.

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Sometimes one opens a book, or reads a first line, and immediately it’s clear that the thoughts and concepts that went into the work were sorely missing from the world, yet nobody had realized it before. Such is the case with this gem of philosophical reasoning. An essay on the essence of bullshit, and an attempt to explain its apparently increasing dominance of today’s communication, this work should be the basis for a much more thorough study of the phenomenon. The exhilarating delight and sheer fun of reading a serious deliberation on the issue must not distract from the fact that this is not satire, nor is it humorous, except insofar as it is a surprising and complex study of a phenomenon commonly thought to be not worthy of such study. To be sure, this combination of surprise and incongruency of means and perceived complexity of the subject are what makes the first reading such a pleasure, and look superficially like a satire of moral philosophy. But to stop at that level would be to mistake the work for its subject, and to miss the chance to develop the tools to attack the toxic prevalence of bullshit in all the public spheres of communication.

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The caveat first: this is not exactly a book written for a general audience. It is a treatise of ethical philosophy, and the reasoning and phrasing is, I felt, even denses in some places than reverence to the esteemed traditions of academic discourse, let alone the subject matter, should have had it be (Though not having tried to set a thorough study of the intricacies of a system of moral acting in popular prose, I of course might be entirely mistaken and this book the closest anyone can get to simplicity in what is without a doubt an discomfortingly complex matter).

Cavalieri sets out to evaluate what entities are moral entities, in the sense that they figure into moral considerations of the actions of moral agents. A thorough review of opinions of the past reveals that none of them can be made consistent. Cavalieri then suggests that the best possible solution for our current state of knowledge of the cognitive life of other species is to extend the notion of human rights to all mammals and birds. Unfortunately, her case is solid, so this is the rare case of a book that has the potential to change my life. No more burgers. Poor me.

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The second of the arguments against a materialistic theory of mind that I’m going to debunk is based on an article by Frank Jackson, “What Mary didn’t know”.

In it, there is a colour scientist, Mary, who has a full materialistic account of colour processing available, she knows everything there is to know about that. But she has lived in a black and white environment all her life. Now Mary is for the first time taken out of that environment and shown something red, the above mosaic of red blood cells, for example. Now, Jackson argues, she knows something she did not know before: she know what it feels like to see something red. Since we have assumed that she had a full materialistic account of colour vision, the quality of seeing is not included in that account. Thus, there is more than said account. QED.

Which, of course, more often than not stands for Quod erit demonstrandum – somthing that should be proven, but isn’t.

Let’s look at the argument in some detail, to see where it might go wrong. What exactly is it that Mary has learned when she sees the red? Specifically, if we asked her, could she tell us what it is she has learned? Alas, she could not. Anything about the experience of seeing red that she could describe in words – say if the experience suggested warmth to her – would necessarily be part of what she knew before. Remember? She knows everyhting there is to know about colour vision. She knows what happens when coloured light hits the retina, she knows how it tickles the brain, and what associations and processes are caused by it. She would even have known what it felt like to see red – in the theoretical meaning of the words, where she can deduce the causal consequences and side effects of such a feeling.

The only thing she can be said to have gained by being shown the mosaic, is the actual experience. But just as in the case of the bat, where being a bat is not a legitimate part of a theory of the bat’s mind, an experience is not something that can or should be part of the theory of mind. The theory should of course describe the experience in all detail and consequence. But it need not, and cannot, contain that experience, nor cause it.

In other words, after looking at the mosaic Mary’s brain is in a state it has not been in before, but which she indeed knew everything about beforehand (which in itself is probably impossible, but that’s beside the point here).

To require colour vision theory to contain actual brainstates is just as silly as to claim that hydrodynamics is incomplete, because there is no actual physical glass of water in it.

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There seems to be a rather curious disconnect between the people doing basic neuroscience research and philosophers of mind. While the former operate on the implicit assumption that mental phenomena are reducible to physical phenomena, and that fully understanding the latter will imply understanding the former, philosophers are struggling with principled objections against this form of materialistic monism.

I recently attended some of John Searle’s Philosophy of Mind lectures, where he introduced seven such objections to materialism, including of course his own Chinese Room argument.

On none of the seven did he manage to convince me, and I’ll present my counterarguments here. I’ll start with the cuddliest of the arguments, put forward by Thomas Nagel, who famously asked

“What is it like to be a bat?”

The argument’s core, as I understand it, is: suppose we knew everything knowable about bats. That is a big assumption, and we never might, but even if this were true, Nagel argues, we’d still lack one crucial piece: we wouldn’t know what it’s lile to be one. Our theories and descriptions of the bat would quantify everything, but they wouldn’t capture the quality of batness. This is known as the argument of absent qualia, for obvious reasons, and it seems convincing on the surface – no physical theory about bats can show us what it’s like to be one, so being a bat is not part of a physical theory.

This argument is erroneous, and I think it’s central problem is a confusion of hierarchies, which I’ll explain in a second. But first let’s have a look at an analogy. Suppose we knew everything there is to know about water. Would that tell us what it feels like to be wet? Of course it wouldn’t, because that is not, indeed cannot be the job of a theory. The theory can describe to us how adhesive and cohesive forces would work to cover our skin with a liquid film, it can tell us how the high specific heat capacity and evaporation will affect skin temperature, how all that combines to create certain nerve impulses, and so on. But to know what it’s like, we’ll have to jump into a river, or, lacking one, take a shower. Does that mean our theory of water is incomplete? No. All it means is that there is a difference between the theory and the real thing. Real water can be experienced, a theory of real water can’t. If there is a hole in a theory at all, it’s in the description of our own minds. But let’s not worry about that for a moment.

That took us off the bat, so let’s get back to it. A theory of the bat’s mind will not, indeed cannot, contain a description of what it’s like to be a bat, because that isn’t even part of the theory of bat minds. It’s part of the theory of human minds. We can perfectly describe what goes on inside the bat’s mind, relate sensory input to motor output via cognitive processes (if you like that way of describing things, which might turn out not to be too great in the end), without missing a thing.

So back to the description of ourselves. What I indeed can not obtain from the description of a bat is what it would feel like for me to be a bat. But there is two possible arguments against that being a problem. The first one is that is very probably a nonsensical question to ask. I am not a bat, and were I a bat, I wouldn’t be me, so it seems pretty close to being logically impossible for me to have the batness cake and feel it, so to speak.

But there is a more profound objection. What is it you want when you ask the above question? You want a theory that, in capturing the structure of the mind, enables you to implement that mind. In other words, you want a theory that produces that which it describes. Which seems even sillier than wanting to be a bat. It’s worse than complaining that your theory of water doesn’t make you feel wet; it’s like complaining that your water theory doesn’t make you wet other things, doesn’t make you emulate water.

Sounds silly. So why doesn’t the bat question sound equally silly? I think it’s because of the hierarchy confusion. The practical purpose of theories is to give you an understanding of it’s subject. So when the theory is one about mind, and thus about understanding, it seems natural to expect to obtain that understanding that is the subject of the theory, when in fact all the theory is going to give you is an understanding of that understanding.

In short: yes, qualia are absent from the theory. That’s because the qualia are not the substance, but the subject of the theory. It’s perfectly able to describe them, as much as any theory is able to describe anything. This is different from the real thing, of course, and that’s not special to the mind, nor is it a indication that more than the physical world needs describing.

Now go find some nuts. You must be hungry.

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The final volume of the Earthsea Trilogy, and, to me, the strongest of the three. It’s main theme, the struggle caused by the realization that life and death are intricately linked (a thought which is part of the dualist/taoist thinking that weaves like a thread through the whole trilogy, and indeed much of Le Guin’s other writing) and one is impossible without the other, unfolds against a backdrop of exciting encounters, and the overall athmosphere of impending doom caused by the widespread refusal to accept mortality still has a very realistic tone today, more than 30 years after it was originally written.

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Cognitive Daily – The negative impact of positive stereotypes

Three groups of asian women were given math tests to perform. Each of the three group got a different focal questionnaire before, the first focused on the contestant’s personality, the second on their race the third on their gender. Sounds like a fairy tale? There’s a reason.

The race group came out doing about 15% worse on the test (the cited article doesn’t provide statistics to put that difference into perspective, but 15% is big anyway, and if you go to the original paper, you’ll find it’s significant at p<0.025. Fair enough.), but the conclusion drawn is ludicrously ill-founded. Rather than conclude, for instance, that bringing up stressful subjects before a test disrupts performance, the performance drop is attributed to racial stereotypes of success and the pressure that puts on asians. It’s called “pulling causalities out of your ass”, I believe. Which, ironically, is one of the stereotypes I have of psychology research. It just disrupts my concentration.

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It is a very common notion that the study of humour is a dry and boring thing to attempt. While that is true, it is not necessarily a bad thing. We wouldn’t expect hydrodynamics to be wet, or neuroscience to be clever, so why should humour theory have to be funny, or even just entertaining? It should, however, have substance, and here most attempts are lacking, this book being no exception. It is little more than a collection of quotes and tidbits from humour theorists over the centuries, with a lot of the name dropping which is so oddly popular in the humanities. “This is what X means, when he says Y” seems to take on the force and role of a stringent logical argument, and rather than being a mepotistic anecdote, it’s supposed to illustrate something deep. But I digress.

The main theses the reader is left with in the end are that the highest moral value o slaughter is achieved when it’s reflective; when we laugh at ourselves, and that humour is the uniquely human ability to counter the absurdity of physical existence with a psychological distancing movement, and a mocking finger pointed at the physical from afar. Which, of course, is just reactionary balderdash.

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Children Learn by Monkey See, Monkey Do. Chimps Don’t. – New York Times

(If you don’t have one of the NYTimes accounts annoyingly required to read the story, consider BugMeNot and its Firefox Extension)

The study quoted reports that when shown how to open a box, chimps can leave out causally unnecessary steps, while human infants tend to reproduce everything, even if they know it to be unnecessary. The researchers conclude that this imitation may enable the learning of complex new behaviours, which the child wouldn’t understand at first sight, and thus couldn’t analyse causally.

Most intriguing about this is that the other obvious explanation, that the children are trying to conform in a social situation with an adult, and are willing to give up efficiency to do so, may be the same thing. Culture and tradition, after all, are the codified learning of behaviors which do not seem to make immediate causal sense.

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